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Review of the Economic
Development
in the Western Balkan
States
Paulina Biernacka
Foreword
Ten years after the end of the armed conflict, the
Western Balkans1 are still being considered as
the “land of the unsuccessful policies”. Enormous
financial and technical assistance transferred by
the International Community has not managed
to meet the goals of integrating the region with-
in itself as well as within the European markets.
Explanation for this can be found in the conse-
quences of the war and the remnants of the so-
cialist state. The complexity of current institutio-
nal/political arrangements combined with the li-
mited willingness of the regional actors to intro-
duce and implement much of the needed reforms
have additionally contributed to the current state
of affairs.
The economy and politics in the region intertwine
to an extent as probably in none of the other
post-communist states. Therefore, the paper pre-
sents the recent economic performance of the
Western Balkan countries in the light of their li-
mited institutional development and lack of effi-
cient regional cooperation. The paper discusses
the importance of foreign direct investments’ in-
flow for the economic growth of the “latecomer”
states and presents major drawbacks which limit
the influx of the foreign capital to the region. It
presents private sector activity and regional co-
operation programmes. It discusses the role of the
International Community with the main focus
on the activities of the European Union. The EU
is examined not only as the main aid donor but
more importantly as a foreign trade partner. Fur-
thermore, it analyses the impact of the presence
of the International Community and their strate-
gies towards the region with the special atten-
tion to the EU. Finally, it presents recommend-
ations for the improvement of the economic per-
formance in light of the enhanced political coope-
ration between the EU and the region.
The legacies
The Western Balkan region2 has inherited two
different legacies distinguishing it to a great ex-
tent from the countries of the Central and East-
ern Europe. These are:
– ethnic conflict eruption in the beginning of the
transition process in the early 1990s
5
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– “home-grown communism” (except for Albania)
which was not directly and by force “imported”
from the Soviet Union but was partially develo-
ped internally and adjusted to the local condi-
tions and environment3.
Besides the difficult constitutional arrangements,
these two factors combined with each other have
been largely accountable for the present condi-
tion of the region and its slow transition capabi-
lities into the fully functioning market economy.
The consequences of the military actions such as
destruction of infrastructure, trading links, gover-
nance and education system, displacement of
people, and creation of black market are apparent
and still existing. However, the key features of
region’s present economic and political gover-
nance can be associated with the region’s socialist
past. The heritage of the Yugoslavia’s political
construction has shown to be extremely resilient
to any attempts of reforms. The two core elements
of the communist system such as the institution
of self-management connected with social owner-
ship and deficit of corporate political and econo-
mic governance accountability have harmfully in-
duced the current endeavours to restructure the
economies of the Western Balkan states4. The
implementation of two disciplining mechanism
in business and politics such as the possibility of
bankruptcy for inefficient state companies and
real prospects of electoral political defeat are not
fully implemented till the present day. The conse-
quences of such conditions connected with the
remnants of war are reflected in the region’s eco-
nomic performance.
Recent economic performance5
By 2003, none of the Western Balkan states, ex-
cept for Albania6, has managed to regain the le-
vel of the real GDP of 1989. In 2001, the region
reached only 74% of its pre-transition level7 (see
Table 1).
Even though, since the year 2000, there has been
an average annual growth of 4.5%, it has to be
taken into account that the starting point was
extremely low8. The continued growth has been
a positive sign for the Western Balkans, yet its
disproportion across the discussed countries has
shown that the region can be viewed as extremely
segmented in terms of economic development.
The economic backwardness of the region is illu-
strated by the Table 2. The level of real GDP per
capita reached in 2003 a regional average of 2400
euro, stretching from 700 euro in Serbian province
of Kosovo to 5400 euro in Croatia9. In comparison
to the EU average, GDP per capita for Serbia/Mon-
tenegro and Macedonia represents currently 8%
and stands at 23% for Croatia. Even if in the forth-
coming ten years a doubling of per capita income
would take place, then still the overall perfor-
mance would be estimated at the 16% of the
current EU average10.
One of the few encouraging indicators is infla-
tion, which through the policies of external an-
chors (fixed exchange currency rates) has been
put under control. However, the unemployment
rate exposes structural problems existing in the
region. Even though, many people reported to
be without a job are involved in a casual labour
in an informal sector, many of them are long-time
unemployed with no scenario of finding gainful
employment again.
The chronically high unemployment rates com-
bined with low job creation level are reflected in
high poverty rates11. Additionally, policies of pri-
vatisation implemented in most of the discussed
countries have contributed to the already high
unemployment indicators12. Therefore, all states
of the Western Balkans have been faced with 
a dangerous phenomenon of brain drain. Wide-
ranging lack of economic stability has resulted
in high immigration rates to the EU countries
and USA. Most of the refugees and job seekers,
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whose large proportion is highly qualified, as well
as school-age population after completing univer-
sity education abroad, will probably never return.
The exodus started already during the war but it
escalated greatly after the end of the armed con-
flict when only in the period between 1996–1998
the total number of emigrants from Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH) was estimated at 42 thousand
people. The United Nations Development Pro-
gramme research from 2000 has shown that 62%
of the Bosnia and Herzegovina’s youth would like
to leave the country13. In case of Albania, consi-
dered to be one of the poorest countries in Europe,
a sixth of country’s population (including one
third of country’s intelligentsia) was seeking em-
ployment abroad as of 2001. Only 5% of resear-
ches, lecturers and students currently enrolled
in foreign universities in Italy, Greece, Canada,
and Germany are estimated to return to their ho-
me country14. Serbia and Montenegro are among
states with the highest “permit to stay” applica-
tion rate in EU.
The loss of the human resources has started to
decline in 2003 with region’s three countries ap-
pearing in the top 40 nationalities seeking asy-
lum in industrialised states against four in 2002.
According to the EU “it may reflect an increasing
sense of stability and economic opportunity”15.
However, the migration process is still taking
place. This might have extremely harmful effects
for the Western Balkans if proper governmental
policies encouraging the return of skilled work-
ers are not implemented. Migrants’ return would
increase the productivity and stimulate human
capital formation. Through knowledge and tech-
nology transfer their return would boost econo-
mic development. Accumulate savings could be
brought back to the countries of migrants’ ori-
gin and invested once the disincentives are re-
moved16. However, currently most of the finan-
cial means, which are being transferred back to
the Western Balkan states are used by migrants’
families for everyday consumption purposes, and
rarely for investments.
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Albania
BiH
Croatia
Macedonia
Serbia and 
Montenegro
Real GDP growth (%)
2003
6.0
3.2
4.8
3.3
1.2
Nominal GDP per capita
(in euro, 2002)
1,764.9
1,857.3
6,408.6
2,357.3
2,506.6
Inflation (%)
end of 2003
2.8
0.4
1.5
2.4
8.0
Unemployment rate (%)
2003
15.8
40.6
14.8
31.9
28.9
Source: Altmann Franz-Lothar, Regional economic problems and prospects, in Batt Judy (ed.), The Western Balkans:
Moving on, Chaillot Paper, No 70, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, October 2004, p. 71; Sanfley Peter, Falcetti
Elisabetta, Taci Anita, Tepic Sladjana, Spotlight on South-Eastern Europe, An overview of private sector activity 
and investment, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2004, p. 6.
Table 2. Main macroeconomic indicators in US $
Albania
Croatia
BiH
Serbia and Montenegro (excluding Kosovo)
Macedonia
123.00
91.00
n.a.
49.90
81.40
Estimated real GDP 2003 (year 1989 = 100)
Source: Altmann Franz-Lothar, Regional economic problems and prospects, in Batt Judy (ed.), The Western Balkans:
Moving on, Chaillot Paper, No 70, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, October 2004, p. 70.
Table 1. Economic growth in the Western Balkans, 1989–2003
Private sector activity
In 2002, the average share of private sector in
the GDP was at the level of 58% in the region as
a whole. However, there are considerable differ-
ences within the region. Albania private sector is
contributing to 75% of the GDP while in BiH and
Serbia and Montenegro private sector businesses
share amounts to 45%. Significant number of pri-
vate firms in the region have been established as
new private subsidiaries, affiliates of formerly
state owned enterprises or as new private joint
ventures. The smallest proportion of private sec-
tor firms that have a background in privatisation
exists in Albania, what after taking into conside-
ration the private sector share in GDP, proves
low degree of efficiency of privatised firms. On
the other hand privatisation played a more sig-
nificant role for private sector development in
BiH and Serbia and Montenegro, which only in
recent years started to privatise their state own-
ed companies17.
Foreign trade
The changes, which took place in the region in
the 1990s, have led to the loss of markets in the
other former socialist countries and in liberalisa-
tion of trade with the industrialised world18. In
2003, the overall trade deficit amounted to 25%
of GDP, ranging from 17% in Macedonia to
almost 40% in BiH (see Table 4)19.
Between the years 2000–2003 total imports into
the Western Balkan states (Kosovo excluded) rose
from 18.7 billion euro to 25.4 billion euro, while
in the same period exports increased from 9.8 bil-
lion euro to 11.1 billion euro20.
Important to note is the fact that large amount
of foreign trade, especially cross-border trade, is
not included in the official statistics. The grey eco-
nomy spheres21 such as non-registered criminal
economic activities are for obvious reasons not in-
corporated in the official data and are difficult to
estimate22.
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Albania
BiH
Croatia
Macedonia
Serbia and 
Montenegro
Privatised state-
-owned enterprises
8.78
25.79
16.89
14.11
13.07
Newly established
enterprises
84.46
67.92
70.95
80.37
82.91
Private subsidiary of former
state-owned enterprise
0.00
2.52
2.03
3.68
0.50
Joint 
venture
3.38
3.77
4.05
1.84
2.31
Other 
private firms
3.38
0.00
6.08
0.00
1.01
Source: Building Market Institution in South Eastern Europe, ibid., p. 93.
Table 3. Origin of private sector firms, 2002 (%)
Albania
BiH
Croatia
Macedonia
Serbia and 
Montenegro
Exports of goods 
as % of GDP
7.3
21.2
22.2
29.1
13.6
Imports of goods 
as a % of GDP
29.2
76.9
50.1
47.4
40.2
Exports of services 
as % of GDP
11.8
6.9
30.4
7.0
5.5
Imports of services 
as % of GDP
13.1
4.2
10.5
7.0
3.9
Trade deficit 
(% of the GDP)
-22.8
-36.6
-27.2
-17.2
-25.1
Source: Poeschl Josef, Trade-Offs and Ways Out, Solioz Christophe/Vogel Tobias K. (eds.), Dayton and Beyond:
perspectives on the Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nomos Verlaggesselschaft, 2004, p. 134; Altmann Franz-
-Lothar, ibid., p. 6.
Table 4. Exports/Imports of goods and services as a % GDP, 2003
The European Union became the largest trading
partner for the Western Balkans. It presently re-
ceives about 60% of the region’s exports. The lar-
gest importers are Italy, Germany, Austria, Fran-
ce, and Greece taking some 90% of the Western
Balkan states’ overall exports to the EU23. There
are three main product groups which are being
exported to the EU and other world markets:
– textiles and clothing (mainly from Albania)
– heavy manufacturing (especially transporta-
tion equipment and metal processing from BiH,
Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro)
– wood products and furniture (mainly BiH)24.
In September 2000, the EU has introduced excep-
tional trade measures25 to the countries partici-
pating in Stabilisation and Association Process
(SAP)26. They provide for duty and quota free ac-
cess of products originating in the SAP countries
into the European Union. Only few exceptions
apply, notably concerning baby-beef, certain fish-
ery products, and wine. These regulations have
been far more generous that the ones offered to
the Central and Eastern Europe countries which
were faced with various EU imports duties and
quotas restrictions for the period between four
and five years after the entrance in force of the
Association Agreements27. As a consequence, ex-
ports to the EU have increased by 40% between
1999 and 2002, however the overall level still re-
mains extremely low at 5 billion euro.
Thus, these exceptional trade measures have not
managed to significantly increase export volume
from the Western Balkan states (see Table 5).
The explanation can be found in the EU product
certification requirement, which means that the
exported products must comply with the EU stan-
dards. The EU imposes technical standards re-
quirements to all of its trading partners. It has
established broad legislation in the area of pro-
duct standardisation and conformity assessment
procedure, with an aim to provide proper consu-
mer protection throughout the territory of the
European Union member states (Harmonised Stan-
dards Legislation). These various EU directives
have also created very effective barriers to trade
for the third parties due to the fact that imposed
technical requirements increase the production
costs and impose new expenditures relating to
the process of obtaining certificates28. Thus, in
practise the European market is extremely diffi-
cult to access for the regions’ exporters. There-
fore, lack of domestic product diversification com-
bined with lost trading networks, insufficient in-
formation29 and visa requirements for the West-
ern Balkan’ citizens (limits the possibility of busi-
ness meetings abroad) has not restricted the
growth of exports to an extend as the EU certifi-
cation requirements.
Yet, the EU trade measures are very favourable
to the foreign investors placing its production
facilities in the region. They allow them to take
advantage of lower labour costs and of duty free
exports to the EU market once all of the EU re-
quirements in this area are fulfilled. Therefore,
an environment for the significant inflows of the
foreign direct investments (FDI) has been created.
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Albania
BiH
Croatia
Macedonia
Serbia and 
Montenegro
Western 
Balkans
1999
228
358
1892
591
563
3663
2002
330
624
2357
552
1287
5159
2002/1999
44
75
25
-7
129
42
Change (%)
1999
0.030
0.047
0.251
0.078
0.075
0.481
2002
0.035
0.066
0.250
0.058
0.136
0.545
Source: The Stabilisation and Association Report for South East Europe, ibid., p. 30.
Table 5. Volume and market share of Western Balkans exports to the EU in 1999 and 2002
Exports (euro/Million) Share of EU imports (%)
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI)
FDI inflows are considered as a very good proxy
for a country’s integration with the international
economic networks. Foreigners bring access to
global markets, knowledge and management, skills
and techniques. They often supply transfer of tech-
nologies and train local executives. More impor-
tantly, they provide capital – their own or genera-
ted from foreign banks and investors. They play
an essential role in the strengthening of the pri-
vate sector in the host country, emergence of the
market economy behaviour, and elimination of
distortions inherited from the centrally planed
systems30.
The backward or “latecomer” states can take the
advantage of the technology transfers secured by
the foreign capital willing to profit from the lower
labour costs, thus with time catch up with the
core regions. The intensified trade, which follows
as a consequence, combined with the gradual up-
grading of the country in the export roles, even-
tually leads to an improvement of trade deficit
and overall economic performance. Nevertheless,
some preconditions are needed to achieve suc-
cess: functioning state institutions and an effi-
cient government. They are the ones responsible
for the closing of the gap between is and could be31.
An increase in the FDI inflow is extremely impor-
tant for the South Eastern Europe countries. It
could have an influence on the catching-up pro-
cess and increase of international competitive-
ness. The promise of the prospective membership
in the European structures, stated at the Thessa-
lonica European Council in 2003, should have
been an encouragement for the inflow of foreign
capital as judged by the example of the Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE) states. The EU decision
to open negotiation process in 1997 with five CEE
countries led to an increase of the inflow of for-
eign capital to the most successful applicants32.
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2001
759
519
6,597
919
1,484
2003
1,029
1,014
8,756
962
2,538
Source: Altmann Franz-Lothar, ibid., p. 74.
Table 6. Inflow of Foreign Direct Investments (Million $)
Albania
Italy 47.9
Greece 34.2
Macedonia 2.2
Turkey 2.0
Germany 1.3
BiH
Croatia 13.6
Kuwait 12.8
Slovenia 10.9
Germany 10.2
Austria 10.1
Croatia
Austria 22.9
Germany 22.6
US 15.6
UK 10.3
Luxembourg 5.6
Macedonia
Hungary 38.0
Greece 24.7
Cyprus 8.2
Germany 5.0
Liechtenstein 4.6
SGC
Data not available
Source: Sanfley Peter, Falcetti Elisabetta, Taci Anita, Tepic Sladjana, ibid., p. 34.
Table 7. Investors in the SEE countries (% of FDI stocks), 2002
Albania
BiH
Croatia
Macedonia
Serbia and Montenegro
Albania
BiH
Croatia
Macedonia
Serbia and Montenegro
FDI inflows, with the exception of Croatia, pro-
ved to be low in the region (see Table 7) however,
with the tendency to increase, which might be
associated with rise of the political stability in
the region. The volume and the composition of the
FDI have been mainly linked to the large-scale
privatisation in heavy industry, telecommunica-
tions, and banking sector. The presence of green-
filed investments has been limited and focused
on low-technology, labour-intensive, and export-
orientated industries such as textiles, leather, and
clothing, which regrettably do not significantly
contribute to the economies’ upgrading.
Leading investors in the region are companies of
the EU origin and as in the case of the BiH of the
Arabic root33. The strong presence of the EU ori-
gin companies is connected with the above-men-
tioned EU exceptional trade measures, which al-
low for duty free exports to the EU market.
Table 8 illustrates the distribution of FDI by sec-
tor, demonstrating the concentration on manu-
facturing. This suggests that foreign companies
tend to use region’s comparative advantage such
as proximity to the European markets and low
labour costs.
Important to mention is the negligible presence
of intra-regional investments in the SEE what hin-
ders the possibility of creating greater economic
space in the region of ex-Yugoslavia and Albania.
The reasons behind still not sufficient inflow of
the FDI can be found not only in the weak eco-
nomic situation of the region but also in the gov-
ernance indicators, which would explain the suc-
cess of Croatia in attracting the highest level of
foreign capital. Thus, governmental policies and
strengthening of reform implementation prove to
be the key figure in the economy’s development.
There is a positive association between institu-
tional development and inflow of FDI. The West-
ern Balkan countries characterised by weak bu-
siness framework combined with low domestic
government effectiveness are considered to be
less attractive for potential investors. Uncertain
property rights and contracts, poor governance
indicators combined with underdeveloped infra-
structure and high level of corruption create an
11
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Albania
BiH
Croatia
Macedonia
Serbia and 
Montenegro
Telecommu-
nications
-
0.9
26.3
45.5
Financial 
intermediaries
-
16.5
22.9
23.7
Trade
27.2
6.2
5.7
3.0
Property
-
-
1.8
Agriculture
-
-
0.3
Tourism
-
0.7
4.2
0.5
Construction
6.2
-
1.1
0.2
Other
24.3
20.2
1.3
2.0
Source: Sanfley Peter, Falcetti Elisabetta, Taci Anita, Tepic Sladjana, ibid., p. 35.
Table 8. Distribution of FDI by sector, 2002 (%)
Data not available
Number of procedures
11
12
13
16
Duration (business days)
62
74
51
71
Local costs (US $)
718.98
663.73
798.01
200.11
Source: Building Market Institution in South Eastern Europe, ibid., p. 39.
Table 9. Business Entry. Data for year 2003
Industry and
Transport
42.3
55.5
36.4
25.1
Data not available
unfriendly investors climate. The administrative
barriers to entry combined with so called “bribe
tax” (see Table 9 and Figure 5) regarded by many
as major impediment for the investment do not
scare away the investors to an extend as anticom-
petitive practices of other domestic businesses
(subsided in many cases by the states), high taxes
rates, and low rate of business dispute settle-
ments.
Additional obstructions in the SEE region to the
existing market’s obstacles are barriers to exit,
which should be depleted in order to create eco-
nomic space for new businesses. This would allow
to redirect productive assets from inefficient en-
terprises to new entrants thus enable them to
expand and diversify their production. However,
this requires hard budget constrains, which in
most of the cases is not implemented34. 
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Figure 1. Government Effectiveness (Eastern Europe & Baltic region, 2004)
Source: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2005: Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004
(http: www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters.html)
Croatia
Macedonia
Serbia and Montenegro
Albania
Bosnia-Herzegovina
0 25
Country’s Percentile Rank (0–100)
50 75 100
Figure 2. Regulatory Quality (Eastern Europe & Baltics region, 2004)
Source: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2005: Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for
1996–2004 (http: www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters.html)
Croatia
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Macedonia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Serbia and Montenegro
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Figure 5. Average Bribe Tax Paid in South Eastern Europe by Firms, 2002, % of firms’ sales revenues
Bribe tax is understood here as an illegal forced payments required to obtain necessary business licensing and permits
by firms. As it can be seen form the Figure 5, newly established businesses are most burdened with bribe tax while
the state companies seem to enjoy “preferential” treatment in this area. 
Source: Building Market Institution in South Eastern Europe, ibid., pp. 130–132.
Figure 3. Rule of Law (Eastern Europe & Baltics region, 2004)
Source: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2005: Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004
(http: www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters.html)
Croatia
Macedonia
Serbia and Montenegro
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Albania
0 25
Country’s Percentile Rank (0–100)
50 75 100
Figure 4. Control of Corruption (Eastern Europe & Baltics region, 2004)
Source: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2005: Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004
(http: www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters.html)
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Main drawbacks to the increase
of the FDI inflow
Overall it can be stated that the implementation
process of the needed reforms is accompanied
by the low degree of their effectiveness and en-
forcement combined with the slow development
of the key market institutions. The main obsta-
cle include:
– Weak interenterprise competition. Even
though most of the countries have introduced
policies aimed at removing administrative barri-
ers to entry and exit, in many cased they fail to
operate by discriminating between different types
of investors. There is wide spread neglect of the
existing competition laws.
– State subsidies. State-owned companies receive
the greatest amount of subsidies as a % of sales
revenues, followed by privatised firms and new-
ly established businesses (except for Macedonia
where the privatised firms are the most favour-
ed). The biggest recipients of the subsidies are
enterprises active in services and infrastructure
sectors while trade, mining, hotel and restaurant
sectors are receiving the least of the govern-
mental attention in this area.
– Insufficient Financial Transparency, Protec-
tion of Ownership Rights, and Accountability.
Introduction and implementation of the indepen-
dent financial audits for enterprises is still lag-
ging behind. The system of checks and balances
on managerial performance remains weak, what
contributes to the low level of accountability.
– Institutions for Resolutions of Business Dis-
putes. Albeit the existence of the legal frame-
works, which protect property, rights in the West-
ern Balkans, the functioning of the institutions
responsible for their implementation is poor.
The region suffers from the lack of qualified staff
and weak enforcement mechanisms, not to men-
tion the high costs and time length of such pro-
cedures (i.e. in Albania the costs are 1.5 times the
claimed amount, while in BiH, Serbia and Mon-
tenegro, and Macedonia total attorneys’ and court
fees range form 40 to 80% of the claimed value).
– Non-competitive Market Structures and Busi-
ness Conduct. The degree of restructuring of
state-owned companies remains insufficient in
terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Many of
them hold market dominant position and operate
unchecked by the market structures.
– Poor quality of infrastructure services. There
is a persisting problem with power shortages
(average 11 days per year), water cut-offs (average
9 days per year) and suspension of telecommuni-
cation services (average 5 days per year) what in-
creases the costs of business conduct. There is still
limited access for the private investors to the re-
gulated utility and services although the privati-
sation efforts in this area have already started35.
– Corruption. The high level of corruption is pre-
sent in all of the Western Balkan States (see graphs
on governance). According to the World Bank,
the degree of administrative corruption and state
capture understood as unofficial private pay-
ments, gifts, or private benefits to public official
in order to gain advantages in drafting of laws,
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Croatia
BiH
Albania
Serbia and 
Montenegro
Macedonia, 
FYR
1993
252
13
15
0
74
1994
416
4
7
0
58
1995
455
9
10
0
57
1996
619
61
8
0
85
1997
732
31
10
0
94
1998
719
149
4
1
87
1999
612
113
5
0
83
2000
537
75
3
0
84
2001
617
118
4
1
96
Source: Antonis, Adam, ibid., p. 25
Table 10. Exports to the SEE market (million of $)
regulations, etc. is one of the highest among all
of post-communist states36. It does not only nega-
tively influences the economic activity of the do-
mestic actors in the region but reduces quantity
and quality of FDI inflow. The above graphs on
governance data presenting the highest degree
of corruption control in Croatia prove this case.
Foreign firms are less likely to engage in corrupt
forms of influence on governmental bodies than
their domestic counterparts37.
Most of the drawbacks can be successfully elimi-
nated by the governmental policies, which should
be successfully and visibly enforced. Some initia-
tives in this area have already started to take
place. They include joint statement of the West-
ern Balkans, Romanian, and Bulgarian Ministers
of Economy issued at the first ministerial con-
ference of the Stability Pact38 held in July 2002 in
Vienna. The ministers adopted the Declaration on
“Attracting Investment to South East Europe:
Common Principles and Best Practices” which rela-
ted to the importance of the national treatment
of the foreign investors and confirmed that the
existing exceptions should be precisely formu-
lated with a view of their elimination39. During
the second conference ministerial conference held
in June 2003, the Ministers have agreed to estab-
lish regional network of foreign investors’ coun-
cils with an aim to develop business climate and
to create a platform where the concrete proposal
for the business environment improvement could
be formulated. Additionally, they obliged their
respective governments to remove in the upcom-
ing years the existing obstacles hampering the
investments in the following areas: reduction of
licensing and approval procedures; simplifying
acquisition of real estates for the productive pur-
poses; establishing more transparent laws, regu-
lations and procedures; simplifying residence per-
mit procedure for key personnel for investments;
reducing unnecessary reporting requirements for
the investors; and removing existing obstacles
in the service sector. Furthermore, in June 2003,
during the European Council in Thessaloniki, the
Western Balkan countries endorsed the Euro-
pean Charter for Small Enterprises as an effort to
reinforce business development and good prac-
tice in wider Europe40. What will be the outcome
of these initiatives is still to observe however,
the setting for the improvement of business con-
duct in the region has been created. The increase
of the FDI depends largely on the willingness of
the domestic governmental institutions to intro-
duce the above-presented agenda.
Regional cooperation 
and the role of the International
Community
The ability to create regional cooperation is con-
sidered by the EU as a mean to demonstrate that
the SEE states are capable of sustaining economic
relations among each other and with the rest of
the Europe. Yet, the countries of the South and
Eastern Europe have failed to follow the path of
the Central and Eastern Europe states, which
created the Central Eastern European Trade Ag-
reement (CEFTA) and the Baltic Free Trade Agree-
ment Regional (BFTA).
15
R
e
v
ie
w
 o
f 
th
e
 E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
 D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
in
 t
h
e
 W
e
s
te
rn
 B
a
lk
a
n
 S
ta
te
s
C E S  S t u d i e s
BiH
Bulgaria
Croatia
Macedonia, FYR
Romania
Serbia and 
Montenegro
Albania
Initialled
Initialled
Signed
In Operation
Signed
Initialled
BiH
Initialled
In Operation
In Operation
Initialled
In Operation
Bulgaria
CEFTA
In Operation
CEFTA
Initialled
Croatia
In Operation
In Operation
Signed
Macedonia, FYR
Signed
In Operation
Romania
Initialled
Source: Antonis, Adam, ibid., p. 26
Table 11. MoU Bilateral Free Trade Agreements (March 2003)
The cooperation between the SEE countries has
been rather disappointing in the last decade (see
Table 10). It is still hindered by the remnance of
the war, such as restrictive trade regimes, each
with their own tariffs schedule, and border con-
trols41. However, more importantly, it has shown
deficit of political will of the local institutions
and state bodies. It is the international bodies
such as the European Union, which are the main
actors behind the attempts to integrate the re-
gion, and not the local politicians. The domestic
players are mainly involved in following Brus-
sels’ instructions. Their present contribution to
the regional integration process is insufficient
for the its successful execution.
The local politicians tend to believe that the treat-
ment of the whole region as a trading block could
postpone the ultimate goal of joining the EU. If
the SEE would be treated as a one group, progress
might move at a slower pace adjusted to the
least developed country. All states are interested
in increasing bilateral relations with the EU how-
ever, are reluctant to consider multilateral ap-
proaches. Regrettably, cooperation with less de-
veloped countries is considered as potentially
harmful as it might minimise the chances to in-
tegrate with the EU42.
The role of the EU in the
regional development process
During the second half of 1990s various initia-
tives were undertaken by the International Com-
munity in order to assist the SEE countries to re-
vitalize the regional cooperation within the West-
ern Balkan region. However, projects such as the
Conference on the Good Neighbourliness, Stabi-
lity, Security and Cooperation in SEE (CSEE), the
Royaumont Process, the South East European
Cooperation Initiative (SECI) did not lead to any
substantial results not only due to the fact that
they have been imposed from outside but more
importantly because most of the programs were
not comprehensive enough.
The most recent initiative “The Stability Pact” has
been introduced in June 1999 by the European
Union and the World Bank together with the SEE
countries governments and has been considered
as one of the most successful EU programmes to
date. One of the aims of the Stability Pact has
been the implementation of trade liberalization
between the SEE countries. It has envisaged two-
stage process. During the first stage the partici-
pating countries were to eliminate the adminis-
trative barriers to trade, put standstill on any
measures to restrict trade, and reduce trade bar-
riers towards each other. During the second phase,
the countries were to enter into the World Trade
Organization and establish a free trade area in
the region, thus create the market up to 55 mil-
lion consumers. The Stability Pact has additionally
established the Working Table on Trade Libera-
lization and Facilitation, which has been given
the responsibility for regional economic coopera-
tion43.
Yet, instead of quick creation of free trade area,
the participating countries decided to sign on Ju-
ne 21, 2001 the Memorandum of Understanding44
(MoU), which has established a network of limit-
ed bilateral relations45. This complicated “two-
-sided” approach was influenced by the lack of
political consensus between the SEE states on
the formation of free trade area and economic
differences in the level of development of each of
the countries. The MoU set a target date of De-
cember 2002 to finish the work on all the agree-
ments. In March 2003, out of 21 potential agree-
ments eight were operational (see Table 11). In
case of the agreements, which are still not in force,
tariffs on many items have been already lowered
or abolished. However, poor coordination proce-
dures of these agreements, which introduced dif-
ferent products preferences and rules of origin for
participating parties has been hindering the crea-
tion of effective free trade in the SEE area46.
Critisism of International 
Community
The proximity of the Western Balkan to the EU
countries and danger of the another conflict erup-
tion on the borders of the Western Europe cau-
sed an excessive inflow of assistance policies to
the states of ex-Yugoslavia and Albania. As a con-
sequence the countries of the region have be-
come a “trial zone” for policies of the Interna-
tional Community. The major actors being active
in the area of the economic reconstruction of the
region has been the Office of the High Represen-
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tative (present only in Bosnia and Herzegovina),
the World Bank, the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, the International
Monetary Fund, and various institutions of the
European Union. The impact of their presence has
been widely discussed among the region however
with shadow of criticism. Various studies has
shown that certain policies of the international
organisations are sometimes self excluding and
based on competition among each other and not
on cooperation. There have been policy coordina-
tion problems. There is still no clear division of
responsibilities between the international orga-
nisation especially in the field of bank restruc-
turing where the EU, the EBRD, the World Bank
and the IMF are all involved. Yet, the general cri-
ticism has been focused on the lack of consistency
of the International Community and treatment of
these countries as transition rather that develo-
ping states. The issues such as de-industrializa-
tion, institutional degradation, and corruption
eruption have not been treated as vital47.
Yet, the biggest criticism has been directed to-
ward the role and activities of the European
Union, which for nearly five years after the end
of the armed conflict failed to develop compre-
hensive strategy towards the newly established
states in the region. The EU early policies directed
at the Western Balkan states were criticised for
the lack of unified strategy. Differential treatment
of the individual SEE states and implementation
of more or less favourable policies towards some
of the states with respect to others, have had a di-
rect impact on their economic performance and
transition process48.
It was only since the Stability Pact has been im-
plemented and the Stabilisation and Associate
Process have been introduced, the EU has mana-
ged to rebuild its role as an important “player”.
Nevertheless, the critics of the EU’s approach have
been paying attention to lack of commitment
from the Western Europe. Even the enormous fi-
nancial aid programme for the Western Balkan
states “CARDS” which was launched in 2001 and
is to run to 2006 with a budget of 4.65 billion49
euro has not managed to stop the criticism. The
promise of the prospective EU membership stat-
ed to Western Balkan states at the Thessalonica
European Council in 2003 has been put on hold
with no specified timeframe for further actions.
All countries, except for Croatia, which will pro-
bably join the EU before 2010, have no clear road
map for the future steps towards the EU mem-
bership. Of course the EU has put down the re-
quirements, which needs to be fullfield before the
countries can apply for a candidate country sta-
tus however, it has also noted on many occasions
the financial burden connected with the already
upcoming enlargement (Bulgaria, Romania). More-
over, as a part of the EU strategy, each country
should go first through the Stabilisation and Asso-
ciation Process which is to be followed by the
accession process determined by individual capa-
city to join the EU. At the same time the EU ad-
dresses the structural economic problems of the
region by treating these states as one body50.
Thus, the current picture of the Western Balkan
countries, of which many are still not self-suffi-
cient, as a part of the EU remains to be blurred.
There have been several policy recommendations
for the EU in regards to the discussed region,
which should be taken into consideration. Among
many, the one proposed by the European Stability
Initiative (ESI) deserves attention as it tries to
unite the region with the EU in the most effective
way. The ESI experts believe that the EU should
treat the Western Balkan states as it did Turkey
in the period 2001–2004. From 2001 Turkey was
dealt with as an accession country, even thought
the official decision to start negotiations was made
in 2004. Treating the Western Balkan states as
pre-accession countries without the obligations
to open negotiations until they are fit to do so,
would resolve a number of tensions within the
present EU strategy:
– it would prevent the region from falling into
further backwardness. Allowing them to access
to the pre-accession financial aid would let them
to develop institutional tools needed for intensi-
fied regional development. At the same time it
would assure them with technical and financial
assistance.
– It would eliminate new divisions within the re-
gion. Current status of Croatia as a candidate
country creates further partition of the region.
– It would strengthen reform process and gover-
nance capacity in the region as it would give in-
centives to the domestic governmental bodies to
carry out regional development programmes and
mobilise domestic resources through the princi-
ple of co-financing51.
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An additional issue, which needs to be raised to-
wards the EU and International Community is
the effect of their presence on the institutional
development of the Western Balkan states. Espe-
cially in countries with weak constitutional fra-
mework such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ser-
bia and Montenegro, the International Communi-
ty has unfortunately contributed to state weak-
nesses.
Their presence has trapped these countries in 
a vicious cycle of limited institutional develop-
ment. The International Community, which in
practise is a parallel governmental structure not
accountable to the constitution, has in many ca-
ses took over responsibility of the state in provi-
ding many basic public services which the local
government was either not capable or not will-
ing to provide52. Moreover, as in the case of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, where the Office of the High
Representative has the ultimate power to remove
politicians from their office, the governmental
bodies are reluctant to take any decisions. There-
fore, the proposal of the ESI which would enhance
the development of the institutional framework
and strengthen the role of the central govern-
ments, perhaps would result in reduction of In-
ternational Community presence and allow these
countries to create effective states by taking over
the responsibility.
End remarks
The economic development of the Western Bal-
kan states’ is without a doubt connected with
the armed conflict of the 1990s, socialist past,
complicated constitutional arrangements in some
of the states, limited presence of strong institu-
tions and deficit of good governance. These draw-
backs are all reflected in the economic indicators
and growth rates. Nevertheless, these obstacles
need to be removed by the Western Balkan coun-
tries themselves. The solutions to theses prob-
lems cannot be imposed from the outside as they
will have little chance for success. Yet, the future
of the region in economic as well as in political
terms is currently influenced by the policies of
the international actors, which are active in the
region. The EU has an enormous responsibility
to guide these states into the full EU member-
ship. Without this clear perspective, the Western
Balkans will stay in its economic backwardness
regardless of the financial assistance programmes
transferred to the region. There is a big difference
in being regarded as the future member and
“maybe one day” member. The future members
have the incentives to implement reforms, “may-
be one day members” are disappointed and re-
luctant to change.
Paulina Biernacka
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2 Also known as the South Eastern Europe region (SEE).
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Post-Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation,
European Stability Initiative, 2004, p. 3.
5 The reliability of the statistics from the Western Balkan
region remains low and numbers should be interpreted
cautiously. Depending on the data available, the economic
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lower level than the other countries in the region.
7 Building Market Institution in South Eastern Europe,
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Development, The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development/The World Bank, 2004, p.xxi.
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the Western Balkans see: Cross Border Trafficking in South
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for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2003.
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2487/2001.
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EU Commission External Relations website: http://europa.
eu.int/comm/external_relations
27 In the case of Poland, which signed the Association
Agreement in 1992 (entered in force in 1994), EU agreed on
the full trade liberalisation only from 01/01/1998.
28 For more information regarding the EU requirements in
this area see: “Guide to the Implementation of Directives
Based on New Approach and Global Approach” published
by the European Commission, available at: http://europa.
eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/
legislation.htm
29 The awareness of the existing trade measures still re-
mains at the low level in the region. In addition, the limit-
ed willingness of the local governmental bodies to provide
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